Abstract: Controls on capital inflows have been experiencing a period akin to a renaissance since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, with several prominent countries choosing to impose controls; e.g., Thailand, Korea, Peru, Indonesia, and Brazil. We focus on the case of Brazil, a country that instituted five changes in its capital account regime in [2008][2009][2010][2011], and ask what the impacts of these policy changes were. Using the Abadie et al. (2010) synthetic control methodology, we construct counterfactuals (i.e., Brazil with no capital account policy change) for each policy change event. We find no evidence that any tightening of controls was effective in reducing the magnitudes of capital inflows, but we observe some modest and short-lived success in preventing further declines in inflows when the capital controls are relaxed as was done in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008 and in January 2011 by the newly inaugurated government of Dilma Rousseff. We hypothesize that price-based capital controls' only perceptible effect are to be found in the content of the signal they broadcast regarding the government's larger intentions and sensibilities. Brazil's left-of-center government was widely perceived as ambivalent to markets. An imposition of controls was not perceived as 'news' and thus had no impact. A willingness to remove controls was perceived, however, as a noteworthy indication that the government was not as hostile to the international financial markets as many expected it to be. There are five possible impacts of capital controls on inflows: (1) reduce the volume of capital inflows; (2) change the composition of inflows (in accordance with the specific controls imposed); (3) impact the real exchange rate (preventing an appreciation); (4) enable a more independent pursuit of monetary policy (as it relaxes the international trilemma's constraints); and (5) increase/decrease financial stability. ** We are unable to directly deal with the second impact (composition of flows) given our data limitations and choose not to examine the impact on financial stability since this is a longer-term impact, and our focus here is on the short term (three months). We thus focus on the volume of capital inflows, on the exchange rate, and on domestic monetary policy (the interest rate).
Introduction
Capital controls are a varied lot. While there are many types of controls, one of the most basic distinctions is between controls on outflows and inflows. The economics literature consistently finds controls on outflows as inefficient and harmful (at least in theory -there is not that much distinct empirical research on capital outflows and a careful attempt to connect them to fiscal requirements † ). Controls on capital inflows, however, have been experiencing a period akin to a renaissance since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008. This renaissance has manifested itself both in empirical and theoretical research on the issue, and most importantly in the decision by many countries to impose controls; Thailand, Korea, Peru, Indonesia, and Brazil are some of the prominent examples.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has advocated the removal of all controls on outflows and inflows throughout the 1990s. ‡ The Asian Crisis of 1997-8, however, initiated a slow process of conversion within the IMF that culminated recently with its decision to explicitly and openly support the imposition of controls on capital inflows (euphemistically naming them 'capital flow management policies', and with several caveats and preconditions § ). † Binici et al. (2010) provide a recent empirical attempt to differentiate between the impact of controls on outflows and inflows. ‡ The IMF's campaign to liberalize capital flows culminated in an attempt to insert this issue into its chartersee Joyce and Noy (2008) for details and empirical evidence. § Figure 1 in Ostry et al. (2011) provides a parsimonious summary of these caveats and preconditions.
The basic premise of this new IMF stance on capital controls is that these should be imposed when countries are facing a capital inflow surge and after all other policy alternatives have been exhausted. Here, we are interested in asking the basic questions that should be asked, and probably are asked, at the IMF. Are capital controls on inflows, at the time of an inflow surge, effective? And if they are, what are their effects? We attempt to answer these questions using the Brazilian experience of 2008-2010 in imposing new (pricebased) controls as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) enfolded. The IMF's position is that controls should only be imposed in these kinds of circumstances, rather than as 'businessas-usual' policies; and this position justifies our choice to focus on Brazil's policy during the evolution of the GFC.
There are five possible impacts of capital controls on inflows: (1) reduce the volume of capital inflows; (2) change the composition of inflows (in accordance with the specific controls imposed); (3) impact the real exchange rate (preventing an appreciation); (4) enable a more independent pursuit of monetary policy (as it relaxes the international trilemma's constraints); and (5) increase/decrease financial stability. ** We are unable to directly deal with the second impact (composition of flows) given our data limitations and choose not to examine the impact on financial stability since this is a longer-term impact, and our focus here is on the short term (three months). We thus focus on the volume of capital inflows, on the exchange rate, and on domestic monetary policy (the interest rate).
There are two recent survey papers on capital controls (Magud, et al., 2011; and Ostry et al., 2010) . Both conclude that the literature on the impacts of capital controls is inconclusive, with some observed effects on the composition of flows, but very little effect on volumes of flows (and even less agreement on the impact of controls on the exchange rate and policy/interest rates). † † As Magud et al. (2011) bluntly point out, however, this evaluation of capital-controls literature suffers from several apples-to-oranges problems. Most relevant to our work are two problems: First, the literature mostly ignores the heterogeneity of capital controls imposed across countries and over time, and uses cross-country comparisons that utilize control indices that hide these distinctions (the ones developed by Miniane, 2004 , Chinn and Ito, 2006 , and Schindler, 2009 . Second, the case-studies literature focuses mostly on the two poster-children of capital controls, Malaysia (outflows) and Chile
(inflows). ‡ ‡
Another distinction that appears important is the distinction between short-and long-term impacts of capital account policies. Long-term impacts, while potentially more important, are generally more difficult to identify precisely, and this has certainly been the case in this literature. Many of the papers that do 'manage' to identify some precise impact of controls, do so only in the short-term, and fail to find any long-term effects. The IMF, in its support for re-considering the use of capital control as a policy, argues that their use should be temporary, and their aim is precisely to have a short-term effect on the volume of capital inflows. We thus focus here exclusively on the question of the short-term, and ignore long-term effects which are probably unidentifiable with our methodology, even if they exist at all. † † We do not provide a significant review of this large literature since these two recent surveys are available. An earlier survey of this literature is Edwards (1999) . ‡ ‡ Malaysia famously imposed temporary controls on capital outflows in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis of 1997-8, and this act generated a heated debate on the topic. Chile imposed a set of taxes on short-term flows in the 1990s that were fairly widely perceived as successful in lengthening the maturity of flows.
We focus on a set of controls imposed (and relaxed) The ADH algorithm does not presume to impose any ad hoc assumptions about the likely control group, but rather derives this control group as a weighted average of all non-treated country observations (with weights estimated from pre-treatment data). The ADH procedure allows us to construct a no-policy-change counterfactual and thus measure in detail the impact of the controls themselves. It further does not require us to make many structural assumptions that would have been difficult to theoretically justify.
To be thorough, we need to find a way to examine all five possible impacts. We have weekly data on capital inflows from mutual funds and examine the evolution of these inflows in the aftermath of imposition of controls. Our data does not allow us to examine the impact of controls on other types of flows such as foreign direct investment or bank loans, but the flows we examine are large. In addition to examining the impact on equity flows, we also look for any impact of the controls on exchange rate. We use the same synthetic control methodology (Abadie et al., 2010) in order to develop an alternative counter-factual exchange rate without controls. Again, the ADH methodology allows us to skirt the difficulty of wedding our analysis to any one exchange-rate-determination model;
since the literature on the determination of exchange rates is both voluminous and contentious. We implement the same methodology for interest rates, but since interest rate policy changed very little during this time period in Brazil, our model is not good enough to capture accurately a synthetic control with a good fit for the ex ante data. Given that limitation, we do not present our results regarding interest rates but rather briefly describe them at the end of the next section. We do not examine financial stability since our focus is the short-term (three months) rather than the long-term that is at the core of the financial stability argument. 
The Flows
The weekly mutual fund flows data we use are from Emerging Portfolio Fund
Research (EPFR). We calculate the weekly flows to a specific country as the aggregate flows channeled specifically to this country (from mutual funds whose focus is country-specific).
Flows that target a broader regional market including this country, e.g. Latin America, are excluded from our calculations and are thus not present in much of the analysis. As robustness check, we also calculate the broad regional flows to Latin America, which are the sum of all flows channeled to this region, and evaluate its response to Brazilian capital control. In a similar manner, we calculate the Total Net Asset under management (TNA) by summing up the TNA of all funds targeting the designated country; and obtain the Mutual fund return by taking the aggregated return of all funds that specialize in the designated country.
Other than the fund-specific characteristics, we also control for the country's stock and bond market performance as well as its foreign exchange rate fluctuations. Specifically, *** In May 2008, the tax was extended to cover "simultaneous operations" to prevent circumvention of the inflow tax (circumvention which was apparently widespread). † † † Tax was also expanded to cover margin calls on derivative positions and foreign borrowing with maturities below one year.
we calculate the weekly stock market return on the major stock market index measured in local currency. Weekly bond market return is calculated similarly. Bond index are from JP Morgan GBI and EMBI and are measured in local currency. Weekly Return on Foreign
Exchange rate is calculated as the weekly return of the local currency against USD.
For every episode of capital control, we study 12 weeks (approximately 1 quarter) before and after the control date. We include a country as a possible component of the control group if there are no missing observations in either variables described above for the given sample period. Generally, only a few small countries drop out of the sample. The final control group sample contains 32 to 37 countries depending on the episode.
One of the ADH algorithm's advantages is the ability to use this synthetic control methodology to estimate unbiased coefficients with relatively few pre-event observations.
In our case we use 12 weekly observations pre-treatment for the estimation (see details below); a similar number to what Abadie et al. (2010) use, and only slightly less than the number used in the first paper to use this methodology (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) .
Methodology
Y it is the outcome variable that is evaluated based on the controls' impact on the treated country i, (with i=1 for Brazil and i>1 for all other countries) and time t (for time periods t=1,….T 0 ,…,T; where T 0 =13 is the time of imposition of controls or a change in the control's details) and T=25. In this paper, we examine three outcome variables -three variables are potential policy aims, and which may have been affected by the imposition or relaxation of capital controls: aggregate capital flows (as measured in our mutual fund database), the exchange rate, and the interest rate. for Brazil (i=1). The problem is that for all it is not possible to observe
Although there is no way of accurately predicting the country-specific determinants of Y it , the structure of the emerging market economies is fairly similar and the external shocks affecting them were fairly similar as well (except for mean zero iid shocks it ε ). In this case, Y 1t can be calculated as the weighted average of the Y it (for ) observations from the other countries; i.e., 2,...,
For pre-impact observations ( ) this equation can be estimated to obtain the weights allocated to the different country observations,
The following estimation equation is used for each variable of interest (capital inflows, exchange rate, interest rate), based only the pre-impact observations, to obtain estimates for δ and ω j : ‡ ‡ ‡ This description is a modified version of Abadie et al. (2010) . To simplify comparison, we follow their notation where I denotes intervention (capital account policy changed) and N denotes non-intervention (policy not changed). § § § The Abadie et al. (2010) specifications include an additional vector of variables that determine the variable of interest but are unaffected by the treatment. We estimate the model with additional variables that may affect capital inflows; more details are available in the previous data section and in the data appendix.
(2) Abadie et al. (2010) show that under acceptable assumptions, one can estimate α it for by calculating
where the second term on the right hand side of the equation is calculated using the weights (ˆ ω j ) estimated in equation (1) and the post-treatment observations for the control group (the other countries' observations).
The estimates of equation (1) 
Essentially, we investigate whether the 1 t α we estimated for Brazil are statistically different from the placebo ˆP it α for i>1. This procedure, of course, should only be applied in the cases where our initial estimates of the capital controls' effects yielded any statistically and/or economically significant observed impacts. This is not the case in some of our estimations, and we therefore include only the placebo results for episodes in which we find any apparent impact of the change in the capital control regime.
Results

Results for Capital Inflows and exchange rate
We estimate the weights for equation (2) and then graph the actual evolution of capital inflows (as recorded in the EPFR data we use) and the synthetic control that assumes no change in policy. These figures therefore show the counter-factual evolution of capital flows had the changes in capital account policy not occurred. We summarize these results chronologically for each change in Brazil's capital account policies 2008-2011:
The first act -March 2008 (taxing fixed income only) -is reported in figure 1 . We observe a decline in flows in the run-up to the placing of controls, but that funds start flowing in again (net) about two weeks before the episode; this budding inflow may be the impetus for the placing of controls ( figure 1A ). The placing of controls did not appear to have a large influence, a small and temporary slowdown in the inflow episode that resulted from the controls. While we observe a continuation of the inflow for the counter-factual scenario, Brazil experienced a similar dramatic rise, but with about a month's delay. We are not confident that this delay, however, is a result of the imposed controls since it is also present in inflows to other Latin American destinations. † † † † A similarly very brief deviation from the counter-factual can be also observed for the exchange rate ( figure 1B) . Within 3-4 weeks, we can longer identify any residual impact of the imposition of controls on the exchange rate.
In figure 2 , we report on the second act -October 2008 (removing the fixed-income tax during the Lehman aftermath). Inflows were decreasing rapidly throughout the pre-crisis period starting in July, 2008 (figure 2A). We observe evidence of a slowdown in the capital outflows as a result of this removal of controls in October. The counter-factual Brazil (without the relaxation of controls) would have experienced a continuing capital flight.
LatAm funds, also seem to continue declining during this period, though at a slowing rate, which suggests that the removal of the IOF did indeed have the intended effect. In figure 2B we present the placebo test for this episode; the evidence only suggests an impact that is (weakly) statistically observable as non-coincidental (i.e., the gap between the Brazilian flows and the counter-factual is bigger than for the majority of the placebos). The evidence regarding the exchange rate is not as robust ( figure 2C ), but there still does appear to be a longer-term impact on the exchange rate than the one we observed in the first episode.
Even that, however, appear to be a transitory phenomenon.
Third act -October 2009 (taxing both equity and bonds at 2%): The policy aim was to reduce inflows, and that did not seem to work ( figure 3A) . Brazil continued experiencing inflows as did the rest of LatAm (if anything, the inflows for Brazil are rising faster than for † † † † These results for the LatAm funds are not presented in the figures but are available upon request.
other Latin American funds). ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ We find no evidence that the imposition of controls had any impact of the exchange rate ( figure 3B ).
Fourth act -October 2010 (tax going up to 4% on fixed income): In figure 4A , we again observe an ineffective control as increase in the IOF does not interrupt the continuing inflow episode (as it did for other LatAm countries; but with a bigger impact for Brazil). In both acts Three and Four of 2009 and 2010, the post-control inflow boom episode seem to be large and unique (since the actual is significantly larger than the synthetic and unique to Brazil relative to LatAm funds). The controls did not manage to stem the volume of these inflows, though they may have produced other desirable outcomes (more on that below). In the next change in policy, presented in figure 4B , the IOF was further increased to 6% only two weeks after the previous increase (October 2010). Again, the further tightening of controls appears ineffective in stemming inflows. We do not show the corresponding figures for the exchange rate, but the results are similarly non-significant. § § § § Fifth act -January 2011 (reducing taxes on equities). In figure 5A , we observe a short-run surge in equity investment that is unique to the Brazil funds and may be attributable to the reduction in the tax on equities. But this surge reverses quickly; and postreversal decline is equivalent to a general decline in funds going to LatAm in the first three months of 2011. This conclusion is borne out when examining the placebos graphed in figure 5B ; again, we surmise that a relaxation of controls did appear to have a very-shortterm, but both statistically and economically meaningful impact on capital flows. In the longer-term (three months in our framework) there does not seem to be any significant impact. The same findings, a brief deviation from the counter-factual and a reversion back ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ If anything, inflows increased further after the tightening of controls. Since the controls were imposed as a capital inflow surge was beginning, it is difficult to speculate whether the controls were somehow a signal that encouraged further flows (a possibility that is suggested in the survey data that Forbes et al., 2012 present) . § § § § Results are available upon request from the corresponding author.
to the pre-change equilibrium can also be found in the estimations of the exchange rate ( figure 5C ).
Summary of Empirical Findings -Capital Controls as a Signal
To summarize, after controlling for the counter-factual (Brazil with no capital account policy change) for each event in which Brazil modified its capital controls during the first three years of the Global Financial Crisis, we find no evidence that any tightening of controls were effective in reducing the magnitudes of capital inflows into the country. We do observe some modest success in preventing further declines in inflows when the capital controls are relaxed as was done in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008 and the associated massive credit contraction worldwide. A similar modest success can be attributed to the decision by the Brazilian government to reduce taxes in January 2011.
Both of these decisions to relax controls were instituted during a capital outflow episode, and these successes were more evident in preventing further decreases in capital inflows than in any sustained impact on the exchange rate. These results complement survey responses described in Forbes et al. (2012) . In these surveys of investment managers, the overall conclusion Forbes et al. (2012) reach is that investment managers' reactions to fairly limited capital account policy changes in a large open economy like Brazil is very muted and remarkably heterogeneous. Given these heterogeneous sentiments it may not be a surprise that we find so little impact that can be accounted for by the tightening of the capital account regime.
Why did we find an asymmetric impact? Why is there a significant impact when controls were removed? The interviews that were conducted by Forbes et al. (2012) suggest that many money managers were more interested in the signal content of the capital account policy change rather than in the direct impact of the changes on their tax liability and therefore on their bottom lines. Brazil, throughout this period, was controlled by the left-of-center Workers' Party headed by Lula. ***** Our hypothesis is that price-based, mild capital controls' only perceptible effect are to be found in the content of the signal they broadcast regarding the government's larger intentions and sensibilities. In Lula's case, the government was widely perceived as ambivalent to markets, and especially to the international capital markets. Thus, an imposition of (fairly mild) controls was not perceived as 'news' and thus had no impact. A willingness to remove controls, however, as happened in October 2008 in the middle of the global post-Lehman financial panic and then again in January 2011, just after the transition from Lula to Dilma Rousseff's administration were both apparently perceived as noteworthy indications that the government was not as hostile to the international financial markets as many expected it to be. The removal of controls was thus effective since the presumption was that the government had some antipathy to financial markets and foreign investors. This of course, suggests that the same policy may have a different impact within a political environment in which the government is perceived differently.
Brazil and the BRICS
The weights we obtained in constructing our synthetic controls (see appendix) have no real We therefore estimate the impact of Brazil's five episodes of change in its capital account regime on the other BRIC club members, Russia, India and China. In most cases, we do not observe any statistically visible deviation between the synthetic and the actual flows -so that Brazil's policy changes had no apparent impact. In a few instances, however, there do seem to be notable deviations; in particular we observe that for China in the first episode (an inflow surge), Russia in the second episode (outflow), China again in the third episode (again an inflow surge), and India and China in the fifth episode (outflow). But these deviations fit with our notion that Brazil is attempting to 'lean-against-the-wind' while the other BRICs are facing the same head-or tail-winds themselves. Unlike Forbes et al. (2012), we are hesitant to conclude that this is a sign of an externality; it is equally plausible that these changes in controls were implemented when all the BRICs were experiencing very similar capital inflow surges or capital flights/retrenchments.
Future research
In an IMF April 2011 meeting discussing the IMF's guidelines for supporting the use of capital controls, the Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega voiced his opposition. He declared: "We oppose any guidelines, frameworks or 'codes of conduct' that attempt to constrain, directly or indirectly, policy responses of countries facing surges in volatile capital inflows. Governments must have flexibility and discretion to adopt policies that they consider appropriate." (Reddy, 2011 In what can be perceived as a limited confirmation of this concern, IMF researchers recently concluded, in the case of several Eastern European countries that were experiencing heavy inflows, that the conditions prevailing in these cases did not justify the imposition of controls; and advocated more conventional (and less controversial among economists) monetary and fiscal adjustments (Chowdhury and Keller, 2012) . If one uses the broad framework that the IMF suggests, however, on most accounts Brazil in 2008-10 appeared to have been a good candidate for the imposition of controls.
It is remarkable, therefore, that we fail to find much impact of these controls given their intended rationale in limiting the volume of capital flowing into a potentially overheated economy, and the vocal support these policies have garnered from many corners of the policy world. The reasons for instituting these policies, of course, may be political and electoral in nature, rather than being truly guided by a desire to obtain any of the impacts we described. It may be indeed that policy makers fully understand the inability of these controls to make any substantial impact, but nevertheless resort to adopting them. We leave that possibility for future work. 
